@jakob.winter I’m thinking this over – thank you so much for the illustration; it does a great job of explaining what’s going on in the process.
Questions:
- Does group A connect their temp keypair to a real-life identity to prove that they’re allowed to vote?
- If (1) is true, does group A have to send off a copy of that proof to group B along with their vote?
The thing I still can’t figure out is how to prove that you’re allowed to vote without out revealing who you are to the agents doing the counting, and without relying on a notary that’s trusted by both parties and knows who you are.
Well, in my above example it is simply assumed that you are eligible to vote (so that has to be determined separately).
But assuming you are qualified to vote: In step 5 of the graphic, the agents of Group A publish the fact that they have voted. Only after that entry shows up in their source chain, will Group B and Group C process their vote. So double-voting isn’t possible.
Ah, okay, so identity verification (by whatever means) is out of scope for what you’re exploring; you’re just exploring ways to split up the vote and the voter for anonymity’s sake. Got it!
I finished Pseudonym Pairs now last week. https://gist.github.com/0xAnonymous/8d93d20ac056b45e2ba2d5455cc2024b. Ended up 160 lines of code, very simple. An overview of what the code does on http://pseudonympairs.tech.
